Cryptographic API misuses threaten software security. Examples include exposed secrets, predictable random numbers, and vulnerable certificate verification. Our goal in this work is to produce deployment-quality program analysis tools for automatically inspecting various cryptographic API uses in complex Java programs. The main challenge is how to reduce false positives (FP) without compromising analysis quality. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art solutions in this space were not designed to be deployment-grade and did not address this issue.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic algorithms offer provable security guarantees in the presence of adversaries. However, vulnerabilities and deficiencies in cryptographic implementations seriously reduce the guarantees in practice. Coding issues lead to various attacks, e.g., chosenciphertext attack (CCA) on Apple iMessage [30] , Logjam attack on TLS [13] , and various RSA attacks [19] . Even expert developers can make disastrous mistakes, e.g., exposure of pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) seeds [22] , non-constant-time implementations [29] . Therefore, programming languages and platforms provide cryptographic libraries that can be easily used to integrate security in application code.
However, still there is a substantial gap between cryptography theory and coding practices. Causes for the gap are multi-fold, which include complex APIs [10, 44] , the lack of cybersecurity training [42] , the lack of tools [12] , and insecure and misleading forum posts (such as on Stack Overflow) [11, 42] . Some aspects of security libraries (such as JCA, JCE, and JSSE 1 ) are difficult for developers to use correctly, e.g., certificate verification [31] and cross-language encryption and decryption [42] .
In this work, we focus on the problem of cryptography API misuses in Java and Android platforms. We aim to produce rigorous static analysis tools that can be routinely used by developers -having no or few false positives (i.e., false alarms). A screening tool like this can easily be used to find cryptographic misuses in programs.
Efforts to screen cryptographic APIs have been previously reported in the literature, including static program analysis (e.g., CryptoLint [25] and FixDroid [45] ) and dynamic analysis (e.g., MalloDroid [27] , SMV-Hunter [50] , and AndroSSL [28] ), as well as manual code inspection [31] . Static and dynamic analyses have their respective pros and cons. Static methods do not require the execution of programs. They scale up to a large number of programs, cover a wide range of security rules, and are unlikely to have false negatives (i.e., missed detections). For example, many of the state-of-the-art Android malware detection solutions (e.g., [20] ) are static code analysis methods. Dynamic methods, in comparison, require one to trigger and detect specific misuse symptoms at runtime (e.g., misconfiguration of SSL/TLS). The advantage of dynamic approaches is that they tend to produce fewer false positives (i.e., false alarms) than static analysis. Deployment-grade code screening tools need to be scalable. Thus, we choose the static program analysis approach.
Our design emphasizes the need for rigorous program analysis. The scientific rigor of analysis directly impacts false negative and false positive rates. Excessive false alarms would undoubtedly hinder the deployment of such security tools in practice and missed detection reduces the value of such tools.
Unfortunately, state-of-the-art static crypto code analyses (namely CryptoLint [25] and FixDroid [45] ) are not designed to be deployment-quality. Most of these tools are prototypes for exposing vulnerabilities or for usability studies. CryptoLint was used to report a set of cryptographic misuses in Android apps [25] . The backward program slicing method in CrytoLint has the potential to generate many false positives. In addition, CryptoLint operates on a single binary, and cannot detect misuses that span across multiple binaries. We found that reusable components are commonly packaged as different jars in large Java projects.
A more recent state-of-the-art solution is FixDroid [45] . FixDroid is a proof-of-concept plugin for helping Android developers write secure Java code. However, FixDroid only provides localized static code analysis. It cannot process inter-procedural data flows through method parameters, which cause missed detection problems (e.g., missing 23 of the 32 violations on Apache projects Juddi and Ofbiz as shown in Table 6 ).
Google Play recently deployed an automatic app checking mechanism for SSL/TLS hostname verifier and certificate verification vulnerabilities [9] . However, the inspection appears to only target obvious misuses, e.g., return true in verify method or an empty body of checkServerTrusted [2] .
The main feature of our solution CHIRON is a set of algorithms that systematically remove irrelevant elements during program analysis to reduce false alerts. These heuristics are derived from empirical observations of common programming idioms and language restrictions to remove irrelevant resource identifiers, arguments about states of operations, constants on infeasible paths, and bookkeeping values. Our detection is built on rigorous forward and backward program slicing techniques. Although program slicing is a well-known technique for identifying the set of instructions that influence or are influenced by a program variable, its direct application to screening crypto implementations has several practical issues. First, one needs to map cryptographic properties into slicing criteria and analysis algorithms. Our most complex analysis (for Rule 15 on insecure RSA/ECC key sizes) involves multiple rounds of forward and backward slicing.
A more challenging problem that has not been discussed by prior work is the excessive number of false positives that basic program slicing generates. For example, several types of detection require one to search for constant secrets or values, e.g., password or initialization vector (IV). However, benign constants or irrelevant parameters may be mistaken as violations. We found that a substantial portion of the instructions identified by program slicing does not impact security at all. Casual application of backward or forward slicing would make such a tool useless due to low accuracy.
We have made substantial progress toward building a deploymentquality tool. We name our tool as CHIRON 2 . Our technical contributions and security findings are summarized as follows.
(1) Our most significant contribution is in-depth and rigorous program analysis methods. These methods enable us to i) have low false alerts, ii) reduce missed detections, and iii) enforce new security rules, all of which are necessary for a deployment-grade solution. CHIRON supports intra-and inter-procedural forward program slicing, in addition to backward slicing. The advantage of forwarding slicing is two-fold. First, it allows us to enforce new rules that prior work cannot cover, for example, to detect custom SSLSocketFactory lacking proper hostname verification (Rule 6 in Table 1 ). Second, forward slicing is used in three of our five heuristic algorithms to reduce false positives. Specifically, we run inter-procedural forward slicing on backward program slices to eliminate irrelevant elements. Our heuristic algorithms are extremely effective. For eight of our rules, they reduce the total number of alerts by 86% in Apache and 79% in Android ( Figure 3 ). With heuristics enabled, CHIRON has a 2.39% false positive rate (confirmed by the manual analysis of the 2,009 Apache alerts). We also compared the detection accuracy with FixDroid. 3 For most (75%) of the Apache projects, CHIRON takes less than 3 minutes to screen. The average runtime for an Android app is less than 3 minutes.
(2) We made significant progress toward providing a much broader cryptographic guarantee. In comparison to CryptoLint [25] (Table 5) . We observe violations in most of the categories, including hardcoded keystore passwords, e.g., notasecret is used in multiple Google libraries (Table 4) . We also detected multiple SSL/TLS (MitM) vulnerabilities that Google Play's automatic screening seemed to have missed. In Section 6, we share our experience of interacting with Apache teams and their pragmatic constraints e.g., backward compatibility, operation in humanless settings, etc.
Developers need help to write secure code [12] . CHIRON's innovation is the effective reduction of false positives in static analysis, removing a major deployment roadblock. This deployment goal also motivates innovative research. CHIRON is part of our team's ongoing effort to fill in that gap. We disclosed our findings to Apache and Google to harden their code. We plan to open source our code, as well as release benchmarks for building a foundation for the science of security.
THREATS, CHALLENGES AND OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the types of vulnerabilities in our threat model, and how these cryptographic issues are mapped to program analysis. Finally, we discuss the technical challenges to detect these issues with program analysis.
Threat Model
We summarize the vulnerabilities that CHIRON detects and rank their severity. The vulnerabilities, attack types, and relevant cryptographic properties are listed in Table 1. (1) Vulnerabilities due to predictable secrets. Software with predictable cryptographic keys and passwords are inherently insecure [25] . (2) Vulnerabilities from MitM attacks on SSL/TLS. Improper customization of Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) APIs may result in man-in-the-middle (MitM) vulnerabilities [27, 31] . CryptoLint [25] does not detect these vulnerabilities. [25] . Static salts make dictionary attacks easier on password-based encryption (PBE). In addition, static initialization vectors (IVs) in cipher block chaining (CBC) and electronic codebook (ECB) modes are insecure [14, 40] . (5) Vulnerabilities from feasible bruteforce attacks. MD5 and SHA1 are susceptible to hash collision [51, 52] and preimage [6, 21] attacks. In addition, bruteforce attacks are feasible for 64-bit symmetric ciphers (e.g., DES, 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish) [16] . 1024-bit RSA/DSA/DH and 160-bit ECC are also weak [1] . RFC 8018 recommends at least 1000 iterations for PBE [43] .
Similar to other static analysis based solutions (e.g., [25, 47] ), CHIRON cannot detect side-channel vulnerabilities. How severe are these vulnerabilities in Table 1 ? Each case has specific attack scenarios documented in the literature. To prioritize alerts, we categorize their severity into high, medium, and low, based on i) attacker's gain and ii) attack difficulty. Vulnerabilities from predictable secrets and SSL/TLS MitM are immediately exploitable and substantially benefit attackers. Commercially available rainbow tables allow attackers to easily obtain pre-images of MD5 and SHA1 hashes for typical passwords [7] . Hash collisions enable attackers to forge digital signatures or break the integrity of any messages [51] . INTERNET protocols (e.g., SSL/TLS, IKE, SSH) are also subject to hash collision attacks [17] . Therefore, these vulnerabilities are considered as high risks. Vulnerabilities from predictability and CPA provide substantial advantages to attackers by significantly reducing attack efforts. Therefore, they are considered as medium level risks. Brute-forcing ciphers requires non-trivial effort. We classify its risk as relatively low.
Mapping Vulnerabilities to Program Analysis
The 16 vulnerabilities in Table 1 require different program analysis methods for detection. In this section, we describe how we bridge the two paradigms of cryptography and program analysis. Table 1 summarizes the corresponding slicing techniques. The last column presents CHIRON's coverage compared to CryptoLint [25] . CHIRON has 9 new cases. Note that our new mapping technique provides more abstraction and leverages both backward and forward slicing techniques. Future research can use the same technique to improve CHIRON by covering more rules or reducing false positives.
Next, we use examples to illustrate the process of mapping cryptographic vulnerabilities to concrete program analysis tasks. This mapping process is manual and only needs to be performed once for each vulnerability. In what follows, we use rule i to refer to the detection of vulnerability i in Table 1 .
For example, Rule 5 is to detect the abuse of the X509TrustManager interface. We reduce the problem to detecting three concrete cases: i) throwing no exception after validating a certificate in checkServerTrusted, ii) unpinned self-signed certificate with an expiration check, and iii) not providing a valid list of certificates in getAcceptedIssuers. For the first case, intuitively, our program analysis needs to search for the occurrences of throw or propagated exception. Specifically, we use throw as the slicing criterion in the (intra-procedural) backward slicing. Simple parsing would not be sufficient, as the analysis also needs to learn the type of the thrown exception.
Rule 6 is to detect whether any method uses SSLSocket directly without performing hostname verification. Intuitively, to detect this vulnerability, we need to track whether an SSLSocket created from SSLSocketFactory influences the SSLSession parameter of a verify method (of a HostnameVerifier) invocation. In addition, we also need to check whether the return value of the verify method is used in a condition checking statement (e.g., if). For detection, We use forward program slicing to identify all the instructions that are influenced by the SSLSocketFactory instance. Among these instructions, we examine three cases i) a SSLSocket is created, ii) a SSLSession is created and used in verify, and iii) the return value of verify method is used to make decisions. These three cases represent a correct use of SSLSocket with proper hostname verification.
Rule 15 is to detect insecure asymmetric cipher configurations (e.g., 1024-bit RSA). A more concrete goal is to detect insecure default key size use and explicit definition of insecure key size. The tasks of program analysis are to determine a) whether the key size is defined explicitly or by default, b) the statically defined key size, and c) the key generation algorithm. For Task a), our analysis uses forward slicing to determine whether the initialize method is invoked to set the key size of a key-pair generator. For Tasks b) and c), we use two rounds of backward program slicing to determine the key size and algorithm, respectively. We also employ heuristics to discard false positives in Task b). The analyses for Rule 15 are the most complex in CHIRON.
We list the slicing criteria used for each rule in Tables 7, 8 and 9 in the appendix.
Detection Challenges
Two major technical challenges of detecting cryptographic misuses using program analysis are i) maximizing soundness, ii) minimizing false alarms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address these challenges systematically. Technical Challenge I: Soundness of Analysis.
We define soundness as the ability to find all the occurrences of a vulnerability type. For large-scale Java applications, soundness depends on field sensitivity of the analysis and subproject dependency awareness.
• Field sensitivity of the analysis. Being able to track the influence of a field (e.g., String defaultKey) is referred to as field sensitivity. Our analysis is field sensitive. Consider the example in Figure 1 (a) that uses a hardcoded password defaultkey (Line 8) for password encryption. Its data-flow dependency graph is shown in Figure 1 (b). The hardcoded password flows to keyBytes through the field defaultKey. The encryption uses keyBytes (thus the hardcoded password) (Lines 40-41). A field-insensitive analysis cannot track the influence of the field defaultKey on keyBytes and would not report the vulnerability.
• Subproject dependency. Frequently used code in large-scale Java projects are usually organized into reusable subprojects. Each subproject has a separate .jar file. A deployable-grade analysis needs to capture the dependencies across subprojects.
In the above example, the PasswordEncryptor class and the Crypto class appear in different subprojects (as shown Having few false positives is crucial for the deployability of our code screening tools. This false-positive problem has not been addressed in existing solutions (e.g., [25] ). Suppose one needs to find all the constant keys or the keys that are derived from a constant value (e.g., defaultkey) in Figure 1 (a). One may attempt to search the data-flow dependency graph in Figure 1 (b) for nodes with constants. This approach returns three constants, including UTF-8, pass.key, and defaultkey.
However, two out of the three constants are false positives. Neither UTF-8 nor pass.key impacts the confidentiality of the keyBytes parameter in the new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, ALGO) invocation.
We design a set of heuristic algorithms to refine these outputs. For this example, we examine the context of a constant, which reveals that UTF-8 describes the encoding property of a key and has no security influence on keyBytes. Thus, it can be safely ignored. In Section 4, we discuss these new heuristics in more details.
SLICING ALGORITHMS IN CHIRON
In this section, we describe our specialized backward and forward program slicing algorithms to detect cryptographic misuse in Java. Table 1 summarizes the analysis technique(s) for each rule. Our workflow is shown in Figure 2 .
Next, we give the definitions for def-use analysis [58] , forward and backward program slicing [41] . A definition of variable v is a statement that modifies v (e.g., declaration, assignment). A use of variable v is a statement that reads v (e.g., a method call with v as an argument). Def-use data-flow analysis or def-use analysis identifies the definition and use statements and describes their dependency relations. Given a slicing criterion, which is a statement or a variable in a statement (e.g., a parameter of an API), backward program slicing is to compute a set of program statements that affect the slicing criterion in terms of data flow. Given a slicing criterion, forward program slicing is to compute a set of program statements that are affected by the slicing criterion in terms of data flow. Given a program and a slicing criterion, a program slicer returns a list of program slices. Intra-procedural program slicing mechanisms use def-use analysis to compute slices.
To confine inter-procedural backward slicing within security code regions, the analysis starts from cryptographic APIs and follows their influences recursively. This approach effectively skips the bulk of the functional code and substantially speeds up the analysis. 
Slicing Criteria and Backward Slicing
In this section, we describe the intuition behind selecting slicing criteria and then present our backward slicing techniques. The complete list of our slicing criteria and corresponding APIs are shown in Tables 9, 7 , and 8. Slicing criteria. The choice of slicing criterion directly impacts the analysis outcomes. We choose slicing criteria based on several factors, including relevance to the vulnerability, simplicity of checking rules, shared across multiple projects.
For inter-procedural backward slicing, the slicing criteria are defined as the parameters of a target method's invocation. For example, to find predictable secrets (in Rules 1-3), we use the key parameter of the constructors of SecretKeySpec as the slicing criterion. For intra-procedural backward slicing, we define three types of slicing criteria: i) parameters of a method, ii) assignments, and iii) throw and return. For example, to detect insecure hostname verifiers that accept all hosts (in Rule 4), we use the return statement in the verify method as the slicing criterion. Intra-procedural backward slicing. The purpose of intra-procedural backward slicing is two-fold. It is used independently to enforce security as well as a building block of inter-procedural back program slicing. The intra-procedural program slicing utilizes the def-use property of a statement to decide whether a statement should be included in a slice or not. Our implementation for intra-procedural program slicing is standard and utilizes the intra-procedural dataflow analysis framework of Soot.
Inter-procedural backward slicing. Our inter-procedural backward slicing builds on intra-procedural backward slicing. Major steps of the algorithm are as follows. i) We build a caller-callee relationship graph of all the methods of the program (Line 1). The call-graph construction uses class-hierarchy analysis. ii) We identify all the callsites of the method specified in the slicing criterion (lines 2 to 4). A callsite refers to a method invocation. iii) For all the callsites, calcInterProceduralSlices obtains all the interprocedural backward slices, recursively (lines 6 to 10). We show the pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
Our calcInterProceduralSlices procedure is field sensitive. Typical field initialization statements are assignments. After locating a field assignment, the analysis follows the influences through fields, recursively. The pseudocode of calcInterProceduralSlices is given in the appendix.
Forward Slicing
Some of our analysis demands forward slicing, which inspects the statements occurring after the slicing criterion. Our use of forward slicing in this space is new, because previous solutions are only based on backward slicing. Intra-procedural forward slicing. We design intra-procedural forward slicing for Rules 6 (SSLSocketFactory w/o Hostname verification) and 15 (Weak asymmetric crypto). The operation of intraprocedural forward slicing is similar to that of intra-procedural backward slicing. In forward slicing, we choose assignments as the slicing criteria. The traversal follows the order of the execution, i.e., going forward. Because problematic code regions for Rules 6 and 15 are confined within a method, their forward slicing analyses do not need to be inter-procedural. Inter-procedural forward slicing. We use inter-procedural forward slicing in heuristics. Given an assignment or a constant as the slicing criterion, we perform the inter-procedural forward slicing to identify the instructions that are influenced by the slicing criterion in terms of def-use relations. Our version of inter-procedural forward slicing operates on the slices obtained from inter-procedural backward program slicing. Our inter-procedural backward slicing produces an ordered collection of instructions combined from all visited methods.
HEURISTICS
The key requirement of a deployment-quality tool is low false positives (i.e., false alerts). CHIRON provides a set of heuristic algorithms that exclude security-irrelevant instructions and drastically reduce the number of alerts. These heuristics are deduced by observing common programming idioms and language restrictions. Therefore, the possibility of generating false negatives (i.e., missed detections) is fairly low.
Overview of Heuristics
Eight of our rules 4 require identifying constants in a program slice. The purpose is to ensure that no data (e.g., cryptographic keys, passwords, IVs and seeds) is hardcoded or solely derived from any hardcoded values. However, there are many constants that do not impact security. We refer to them as pseudo-influences. Pseudoinfluences are a major source of false positives.
Based on empirical observations of common programming idioms and language restrictions, we invent five strategies to systematically remove irrelevant constants from slices and reduce pseudoinfluences, which are summarized next. For eight of our rules, these heuristics yield a 86% reduction in total alerts for Apache projects and 79% reduction for Android applications (Section 5.1). In CHI-RON, rule checkers apply these heuristics on constants in program slices to remove pseudo-influences.
• Heuristic I: Removal of state indicators. We discard the constants that are used to describe the state of a variable.
• Heuristic II: Removal of resource identifiers. We discard the constants that are used as the identifier of a value source.
• Heuristic III: Removal of bookkeeping indices. We discard the constants that are used as the indices or sizes of data structures.
• Heuristic IV: Removal of contextually incompatible constants.
We discard constants if their types are incompatible with the analysis context. For example, a boolean variable cannot be used as a key, IV, or salt.
• Heuristic V: Removal of constants in infeasible paths. Some constant initializations are updated along the path to the slicing criterion. We need to discard the initializations that do not have a valid path of influence to the criterion.
In the next two subsections, we highlight the details of two heuristic designs based on removing state indicators and resource identifiers. The other three categories can be deduced similarly.
Heuristic I: Removal of State Indicators
A major source of false positives is the arguments of state accessing method invocations, where a constant is used to describe the state of a variable. Consider UTF-8 in Line 38 of Figure 1(a) . Its Jimple 5 representation is as follows, where $r2 represents variable key, $r4 represents keyBytes, and virtualinvoke is for invoking the non-static method of a class. The def-use analysis shows that constant UTF-8 influences the value of $r4 (i.e., keyBytes). Thus, a straightforward detection method would report UTF-8 as a hardcoded key. However, UTF-8 is for describing the encoding of $r2 and can be safely ignored. We refer to this type of constants as state indicator pseudo-influence.
Because heuristics have direct impact on analysis outcomes, they have to be carefully designed. For example, a problematic heuristic would be to discard any constants that are arguments of virtualinvoke. It might generate false negatives (i.e., missed detections). For example, suppose virtualinvoke is used to set a key in a KeyHolder instance with some constant: virutalinvoke $r5.<KeyHolder: void setKey(java.lang.String)>("abcd"). Constant abcd needs to be flagged. We observe that arguments of virtualinvoke appearing in assign statements are typically used to describe the state of a variable and can always be safely ignored. In summary, Heuristic I states that i) arguments of any virtualinvoke method invocation in an assignment instruction 5 Jimple is an intermediate representation (IR) of a Java program.
can be regarded as pseudo-influences, and ii) any constants that influence these arguments can also be discarded.
Heuristic II: Removal of Source Identifiers
Another type of pseudo-influences is identifiers of value sources. We address two cases of such type of constants, i.e., i) for retrieving values from an external source, ii) for retrieving values from a collection or an array. We use an example to illustrate the importance of this heuristic. For the code below, a straightforward analysis would flag constant ENCRYPT_KEY. However, it is an identifier for retrieving a value from a Java Map data structure, and thus a false positive. Constant pass.key refers to the identifier, not the actual value of the key. Thus, it is a pseudo influence. To avoid such pseudoinfluences, Heuristic II discards any arguments of staticinvoke that appear in an assignment. Although staticinvoke may be used to transform a value from one representation to another, it is unlikely to use staticinvoke to transform a constant. ii) Retrieving values from a collection or an array. It is common to have constant array indices, e.g., keyBytes = keys[0]. We discard array indices that are used in the right-handside of an assignment, as well as any other constants that influence the indices. Similarly, we discard the constants for accessing Java Collection objects. In Jimple, retrieving a collection element is expressed as an assignment with interfaceinvoke method call.
Heuristic implementations. Heuristic I, II and III are implemented using our inter-procedural forward program slicing discussed in Section 3.2. ↓ in Table 1 represents the use of forward slicing for these heuristics. In Heuristic IV, we consider the type of a constant to check whether or not it is likely to influence our point of interest. In Heuristic V, we only consider the null and empty strings that are replaced along the way to the point of influence.
OUR FINDINGS
We evaluated CHIRON on 46 Java projects from Apache software foundations and 240 Android applications from Google Play Market. Our experimental evaluation aims to answer the following questions. Selection and pre-processing of programs. We selected 46 popular Apache projects that have crypto API uses. The popularity is measured with the numbers of stars and forks in github. The maximum, minimum and average Line of Code (LoC) are around 2, 571K (Hadoop), 1.1K (Commons Crypto) and 402K, respectively. We perform subproject dependency analysis to build DAGs by parsing build scripts. Subproject dependency analysis was automated for gradle and maven, and was manual for Ant. We identified the rootsubprojects, which are sub-projects that have no incoming edges on the subproject dependency DAG. We analyzed 82 root-subprojects in total 6 . The 240 Android apps cover six categories (Finance, Business, Book, Automobile, Comics, and Beauty). For each category, we selected 20 high popularity apps and 20 low popularity apps. For each category, we selected 20 high popularity apps (number of downloads exceeding 50,000) and 20 low popularity apps (downloads below 10,000). We used Soot to decompile .apk files to Java bytecode in order to interface with CHIRON. We use online APK decompiler 7 to obtain human-readable source code for manual verification. CHIRON runtime. We ran 4 concurrent instances of CHIRON in a Intel Xeon(R) X5650 server (2.67GHz CPU and 32GB RAM). 75% of Apache projects took less than 3 minutes to complete. Average runtime is 28 minutes. A few large projects (e.g., Hadoop and TomEE) took more than 1 day. For Android, the average runtime is less than 3 minutes with a standard deviation of 3.5 minutes. Runtime increases with the use of cryptography APIs.
Reduction of False Alarms
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of our heuristics, in terms of false positive rate reduction. We compare the numbers of reported alerts before and after employing the five heuristics algorithms for Apache projects and Android apps. Results for top six rules with maximum reductions are shown in Figure 3 . Overall for the eight rules, heuristics reduce the total alerts by 86% in Apache and 79% in Android. For Apache projects, we manually confirmed that all the removed alerts are indeed false positives. All 6 We exclude 22 test root-subprojects. 7 http://www.javadecompilers.com/apk constant-related rules (including 1, 2, 3, and 12) greatly benefit from the heuristics and have significant reduction of irrelevant alerts. The most effective heuristic is Heuristic II that eliminates constants that serve as identifiers of data sources. With heuristics enabled, there are a total of 2,009 alerts for the 46 Apache projects. Our careful manual analysis based on the source code confirms that 1,961 alerts are true positives. This analysis confirms a low false positive rate of 2.39%. The detailed breakdown of the confirmed vulnerabilities for each category is shown in Table 2 . In Figure 4 , we show pie charts to visualize the distributions of high severity vulnerabilities.
We investigated the causes of the 48 false positive cases. The main reason is the lack of fine-grained tracking of data objects' fields. A data object may store secrets along with other non-secret constants. The non-secret constant is also reported in our current implementation, producing false positives. We discuss how CHIRON can be improved in Section 6.
Security Findings in Apache Projects
Out of the 46 Apache projects, 39 projects have at least one type of cryptographic misuses and 33 projects have at least two types. Table 3 summarizes our security findings in screening Apache projects. Predictable keys (Rules 1 and 2) , the use of insecure hash functions (Rule 16), and the use of insecure PRNGs (Rule 9) are the most common types of vulnerabilities in Apache. Rules 1, 2, and 16 are high risk and Rule 9 is medium risk. We did not observe any predictable seeds for java.security.SecureRandom (Rule 8). However, we observed two projects that set static seeds to java.util.Random, weakening the randomness.
Vulnerabilities from Predictable Secrets.
16 Apache projects (27 sub-rootprojects) have hardcoded keys (Rule 1, 2). Three (Meecrowave, Kylin, and Cloudstack) of them use hardcoded symmetric keys (Rule 1). Meecrowave uses DESede (i.e., Triple DES 8 ) for obfuscation purpose. Unfortunately, deterministic keys make it trivial to break the obfuscation. Kylin (635 Forks, 1325 Stars) uses AES to encrypt user passwords. However, using hardcoded keys make these passwords vulnerable. In Apache Cloudstack, it appears that hardcoded keys are used in test code, which is accidentally packaged with the production code.
For Rule 2, we found that most of the hardcoded passwords in password-based encryption (PBE) serve as the default. The most common default password for PBE is masterpassphrase (e.g., Ambari and Knox). Manifoldcf uses NowIsTheTime. Setting PBE code to take the default hardcoded passwords without sufficient warnings are risky. Distributions using the default configuration are For Rule 3, most common hardcoded passwords for keystores (for storing private keys) are changeit (e.g., Tomcat, Knox, Judi, Ofbiz and Wss4j) and none (e.g., Knox, Hive and Hadoop). Most of them are set as default. There are 9 projects that have both predictable keys (Rule 1, 2) and hardcoded keystore passwords (Rule 3), indicating persistent insecure coding styles. Insecure common practices. We found three types of insecure common practices in Apache projects for storing secrets: i) hard-coding default keys or passwords in the source code, ii) storing plaintext keys or passwords in configuration files, iii) storing encrypted passwords in configuration files with decryption keys in plaintext in source code or configuration. Java provides a special security APIs (e.g., Callback and CallbackHandler) to prompt users for secrets (e.g., passwords). However, none of these projects provides code to support this option.
Sysadmins are forced to store plaintext passwords in the filesystem, unless they personally modify the code. The biggest danger that these insecure secret-storage practices bring to users is probably the inflated sense of security and not being able to see the actual risks.
Vulnerabilities from SSL/TLS MitM.
Man-in-theMiddle (MitM) vulnerabilities are high risk in our threat model. 5 Apache projects (8 root-subprojects) have dummy hostname verifiers that accept any hostnames (Rule 4), including Spark (15086 forks, 16324 stars), Ambari (814 forks, 778 stars), Cxf (706 forks, 398 stars), Ofbiz, and Meecrowave. 6 Apache projects have dummy trust managers that trust any certificates (Rule 5), including Spark, Ambari, Cloudstack, Qpid-broker, Jclouds, and Ofbiz. It appears that most projects offer them as an additional connectivity option.
Some projects set this insecure implementation as default. We show code snippets in Figure 5 and Figure 6 , where projects use insecure SSL/TLS configurations by default.
When plain sockets are used, it is recommended to verify the hostname manually. We found 3 projects that do not follow this rule and accept any arbitrary hostnames. We also found 7 projects (9 root-subprojects) that occasionally use the HTTP protocol for communication.
Medium and Low Severity Vulnerabilities.
It is important to be aware of the medium and low-risk vulnerabilities in the system and to recognize that the risk levels may increase under different adversarial models.
We found hardcoded salts in 4 projects including Apache Ranger, Manifoldcf, Juddi, and Wicket. We also observe the use of ECB mode in AES in 5 projects and predictable IVs in 2 projects with a total of 40 occurrences. We found 5 projects that use PBE with less than 1,000 iterations (Rule 13). Ranger and Wicket projects use 17 iterations for PBE; and Incubator-Taverna-Workbench and Juddi projects use 20 iterations, much fewer than the required 1,000. System.arraycopy(saltGen, 0, salt, 0, SALT_SIZE); 6 int iteration = password.toCharArray().length + 1; 7 return new PBEKeySpec(password.toCharArray(), salt, iteration);
Listing 1 shows a code snippet from Ranger, which has multiple issues. The number of iterations is proportional to the password size (Line 6), which is far less than 1, 000. In addition, this code offers a timing side-channel. An adversary capable of measuring PBE execution time (e.g., in multi-tenant environments) may learn the length of the password. This information can substantially decrease the difficulty of dictionary attacks. Another issue is that the salt is computed as the MD5 hash of the password (Lines 2-3 ). An adversary obtaining the salt may quickly recover the password. The salt's dependence on the password itself also breaks the indistinguishability requirement of PBE under chosen plaintext attack.
We found various occurrences of Blowfish, DES, and RC4 ciphers for Rule 14. Under Rule 15, we found 3 occurrences of using default key size of 1024 and 9 other occurrences that explicitly initialize the key size to 1024. 23 projects use java.util.Random as a PRNG (Rule 9), where two of them set static seeds to java.util.Random. We do not observe any deterministic seed to a java.security.SecureRandom (Rule 8).
Listing 2: An example of only checking the expiration (checkValidity) of self-signed certificates in Yahoo Finance (TWStock) Android app. The base package name (com.softmobile) of this class indicates that the vulnerable code comes from a third-party library. 
Security Findings in Android Apps
Library violations vs. app violations. Our analysis shows that on average 86% of the detected vulnerabilities come from the libraries. 9 We distinguished an Android app's own code from libraries by using its base package name. Table 4 shows the distribution of vulnerability sources for each rule.
9 A single .apk file (Android application archive) contains both the app code and the code from third-party libraries.
For hardcoded KeyStore passwords (Rule 3), all violations come from libraries. Most frequent hardcoded KeyStore password is notasecret, which is used to access certificates and keys in Google libraries (e.g., * .googleapis.GoogleUtils, * .googleapis. * .GoogleCredential). Besides Google, other high-profile library sources include Facebook, Apache, Umeng, and Tencent (Table 5 ). These libraries frequently appear in different applications. Overview of other Android findings. We found exposed secrets, similar to Apache projects. Table 3 summarizes the discovered vulnerabilities in Android applications. 41 Android apps use predictable keys. 9 of them uses predictable passwords for KeyStores. The categories of untrusted PRNG (Rule 9) and broken hash (Rule 16) have the most violations.
Compared with Apache projects, Android applications have higher percentages of SSL/TLS API misuses (Rules 4, 5 and 6) and HTTP use (Rule 7). For example, 20.42% of Android apps have dummy hostname verifiers (Rule 4), which is more than 2 times of the number in Apache (9.76%) as shown in Table 3 .
Our analysis can detect sophisticated cases that Google Play's built-in screening is likely to miss. We give code snippets for such cases (Listing 2, 3, 4). CHIRON detects a case where developers allow unpinned self-signed certificates with a mere expiration check, as shown in Listing 2. Another case is where developers ignore the exception in checkServerTrusted method as shown in Listing 3. In addition, CHIRON detects 13 occurrences of improper use of SSLSocket without manual Hostname verification in 12 apps. One such example is shown in Listing 4, where SSLSocket is used in WebSocketClient without manually verifying the hostname 10 . In comparison, Google Play's inspection appears to only detect obvious misuses [2] .
Grouping security violations by app popularity or category did not show substantial differences across groups.
Comparison with FixDroid
We compared the detection rates of CHIRON and FixDroid [45] . CHIRON and FixDroid share 9 rules. Finding violations in FixDroid requires manual effort on Intellij IDEs. So we chose two Apache projects (Juddi and Ofbiz) for evaluation that cover maximum common rules. Results are shown in Table 6 . FixDroid has many false negatives (i.e., missed detections). It fails to report 23 vulnerabilities that CHIRON finds. FixDroid's detection result is a subset of CHIRON's. FixDroid does not track values that are passed across methods as parameters, thus, its def-use analysis is incomplete. An example is shown in Listing 5, where FixDroid cannot detect the HTTP URLs that are passed to the method connect through the urlStr parameter (Rule 7).
Listing 5: An example of FixDroid's false negative. FixDroid misses any influence through the parameter of connect method.
1 public int connect(String urlStr) { 2 URL url = new URL(urlStr); 3 } Summary of experimental findings.
• Our heuristic algorithms for reducing false positives are extremely effective. For eight rules, they bring a 86% reduction of alarms in Apache projects and a 79% reduction in Android applications. We manually confirmed that all the removed alerts are indeed false positives. We also carefully examined the 2,009 Apache alerts (after applying heuristics) and concluded that the overall false positive (FP) rate is 2.39%. 
DISCUSSION
Code correction. Most of the Apache developers' responses to our vulnerability disclosure reports were prompt and insightful. We highlight the feedback from some projects. Apache Spark promised to remove the support of dummy hostname verifier and trust store. Ofbiz promised to fix the reported issues of constant IVs and keystore passwords. Apache Ranger already fixed our report of constant default values for PBE [8] and insecure cryptographic primitives [3] . Regarding MD5, Apache Hadoop justifies that its MD5 use is for the per-block checksums for Hadoop file systems (HDFS)'s consistency and the setup does not assume the presence of active adversaries. For some cases, developers explained that certain operational constraints (e.g., backward compatibility for clients) prevent them from fixing the problems. For example, Apache Tomcat server has to use MD5 in its digest authentication code, because major browsers do not support secure hash functions (as defined in RFC 7616) for digest authentication. Digest authentication is rarely used in the wild 11 .
The thorniest issue is secret storage. One justification for developers' choice of storing plaintext passwords or keys in file systems is for supporting humanless environments (e.g., automated scripts to manage services). However, first, not all deployment scenarios are server farms in a humanless environment. Projects should also provide the secure option, which is to use Java callback to prompt human operators for passwords. Second, not properly disclosing and documenting the insecure configurations does a great disservice to the project's users. Our limitations. No static analysis tool is perfect. CHIRON is no exception. We discuss the detection limitations of CHIRON and future improvements.
• False positives. Our current heuristics design can be further improved. A major source of false positives comes from the use of custom objects to store secret information with other non-secret meta-data. Specifically, if one property of a custom object is set with a non-secret constant and another property of that custom object defines a secret key, then CHIRON flags the non-secret, which is a false positive. 
RELATED WORK
Tools to detect cryptographic misuse. Cryptographic misuse detection tools can be broadly categorized into two groups, i.e., static analysis (e.g., CryptoLint [25] and FixDroid [45] ) and dynamic analysis (e.g., MalloDroid [27] , SMV-Hunter [50] , and AndroSSL [28] [37] that supports code generation for several common cryptographic tasks (e.g., data encryption). It also provides lightweight analysis that can detect some of the cryptographic misuses (e.g., the use of insecure symmetric ciphers and modes). In [38] , authors present CrySL, that offers a definition language to specify rules for correct usages of Crypto APIs. CrySL also presents a compiler to translate the rules to a static analysis-based enforcement mechanism. Our work is supplementary to this where we focus on improving the efficacy of static analysis by including more diverse rules, enabling 12 It is unclear why Spark chose to use insecure PRNG, even for non-security purposes. detection of misuses spanning across multiple binaries and reducing false positive.
Dynamic analysis tools are orthogonal to the static analysis tools. Most of them use simple static analysis to narrow-down the number of potential apps for dynamic analysis. For example, MalloDroid [27] uses a list of known insecure implementations from the libraries to initially screen the apps. SMV-Hunter [50] looks for apps that contain any custom implementation of X509TrustManager or HostNameVerifier for initial screening.
Rahaman and Yao presented TaintCrypt [47] that uses static taint analysis to discover various cryptographic misuses and implementation issues in C/C++ programs. TaintCrypt leverages CLANG static analyzer to enable compile-time screening. It uses symbolic execution based path exploration to reduce false alarms. In contrast, CHIRON uses lightweight forward slicing based heuristics to address false alarms, thus CHIRON is more suitable for large-scale projects. In addition, CHIRON detects cryptography misuses in Java, which has different analysis goal than TaintCrypt.
Fuzzing has been demonstrated to automatically discovering vulnerabilities [24, 48, 49] . However, these techniques are limited to finding only the input guided vulnerabilities with externally visible behaviors (e.g., triggering program crashes [49] or anomalous protocol states [24, 48] ). It is unclear how to use them to find vulnerabilities that do not exhibit any such externally visible behaviors, for example, the use of "predictable" IVs in ciphers, the exposure of secrets in the source code or the use of legacy cryptographic primitives.
In [23] , Chi et al. presented a system to infer client behaviors by leveraging symbolic executions of client-side codes. They also showed that using such knowledge it is possible to filter anomalous traffics to the server. Our work has a different goal. We propose to find vulnerabilities in the source-code with lightweight program analysis before deploying the software. Other static analysis tools for non-crypto vulnerabilities. Static code analysis has been extensively used for non-crypto related software problems, such as malware analysis and detection [26, 46, 57] , vulnerability discoveries [18, 39] , data leak detections [20] . It also has the potential to check and report whether a piece of code complies with certain rules or not [55, 56] .
There are some commercially available static analysis tools from Gramma Tech [33] and Synopsys [53] for detecting critical bugs and security issues. However, none of them thoroughly addresses the issue of cryptographic misuses. Secure API wrappers have been shown to effectively eliminate the invocation of potentially vulnerable functions (e.g., unsafe memory copy) or operations (e.g., unsanitized SQL queries) at Google [35] . cryptography.io is a crypto library with simpler APIs for Python, requiring little to no configuration choices. These approaches are useful to reduce misuses. Studies showed that simpler crypto APIs do not completely solve developers' problems [10] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described our effort of producing a deploymentquality static analysis tool CHIRON to detect cryptographic misuses in Java programs. This effort led to significant new research outcomes, including i) designing new and effective heuristic algorithms to reduce false positives, ii) covering a wide range of vulnerabilities with new analysis methods, and iii) supporting inter-procedural field-sensitive def-use analysis, as well as capturing dependencies across multiple binaries. CHIRON enabled us to obtain a trove of new security insights about Java secure coding practices, including both current security deficiencies and pragmatic constraints that hinder secure coding. Besides correcting misuses, we call for companies and developers to adequately document and inform their users about the security risks associated with their coding choices. We plan to open source our code and release benchmarks for scientific comparison. Set Table 9 : Java APIs used as slicing criteria in our inter-procedural backward slicing and their corresponding security rules. Boldface indicates the parameter of interest.
